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COMPETITION AT THE TELLER'S WINDOW?:
ALTERED ANTITRUST STANDARDS FOR
BANKS AND OTHER
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Earl W. Kintner* and Joseph P. Bauer**
INTRODUCTION
Congressional and judicial attitudes towards the banking industry
have reflected two, sometimes conflicting, goals-the maintenance
of the solvency of financial institutions to protect the interests of
depositors, other creditors and the economy at large; and the promo-
tion of competition among these institutions and in the economy.
The advancement of these goals has been reflected in the application
of the antitrust laws to the industry.
For the most part, the Sherman2 and Clayton Acts3 apply with the
same force and scope to financial institutions as to other industries.
In some cases, however, the goal of institutional protection is
* Senior Partner, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington D.C.; Former
Chairman and General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission. A.B. 1936, DePauw University;
J.D. 1938, Indiana University.
** Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. 1965, Univers-
ity of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1969, Harvard University.
This article is an advance version of a chapter in Volume IX of the treatise Federal
Antitrust Law by Earl W. Kintner and Joseph P. Bauer, to be published by Anderson
Publishing Co. All rights reserved. The authors would like to thank Joseph Chapelle, Notre
Dame Law School Class of 1986, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. See Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development, and Im-
plications for Antitrust, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 225, 256 (1983); see also Loring & Brundy, The
Deregulation of Banks, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1985); Scott, The Dual Banking System:
A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977); Seeley, Banks and An-
titrust, 21 Bus. LAW. 917 (1966); Wynne & Spagnola, The Myth of Bank Deregulation, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 383 (1985); Annotation, Application to Banks and Banking Institutions
of Antimonopoly or Antitrust Laws, 83 A.L.R. 2d 374 (1962).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. Id. §§ 12-24.
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favored, and the antitrust laws are relaxed to a degree." As an exam-
ple, the Bank Merger Act' insulates banks to some extent from the
full reach of section 7 of the Clayton Act, in the belief that certain
mergers will strengthen the banks and will promote the financial
well-being of the banks' customers and the community in which they
operate. By contrast, in some other cases the goal of advancing com-
petition is elevated, and banks are held to a higher antitrust standard
than other industries. For example, certain conditional transac-
tions-tying arrangements, reciprocal dealing or exclusive dealing
arrangements-are tested by more stringent standards than those ap-
plied to other industries.6 This article will first provide an overview
of the banking industry in the United States, with an examination of
the different kinds of institutions and their services,7 and of the dif-
ferent types of banking regulations. An appreciation of the
variegated nature of the banking industry will help in evaluating
claims either for an antitrust exemption-total or partial-or for
higher antitrust standards. The article will then consider three areas
of antitrust law in which banks have been singled out for special
4. The fact of governmental regulation may displace normal competitive forces in other
ways. In the first instance, entry into and exit from the banking industry is not free; banks
must satisfy minimum capital requirements, the officers must meet certain standards, and in
some cases (particularly with respect to the opening of branch banks) entry is absolutely
precluded by a determination that the banking needs of the area are already satisfied by ex-
isting institutions. Even after entry takes place, full competition does not prevail. For exam-
ple, state usury laws may prevent banks from charging high interest rates which the com-
petitive market would otherwise permit; on the other side of the coin, federal or state
authorities may put a ceiling on the rate of interest that institutions may pay to depositors,
thus displacing competition for the right to borrow money. As another example, limitations
on the number of branches a bank may open, or geographic limitations on the places in which
a bank may operate, result in the elimination of competition among banking institutions
which might otherwise exist.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
6. See generally infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.
7. The kinds of services provided by different banking and nonbanking institutions is in
considerable flux, and so certain assertions may have to be qualified by later developments.
For example, twenty years ago, only commercial banks were able to offer demand accounts,
i.e., checking accounts; today, other financial institutions offer similar services, (at least to in-
dividuals and not-for-profit organizations), whether credit unions call them "share draft ac-
counts" or savings institutions call them "NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts."
These developments are largely the product of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (Omnibus Banking Act) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), and the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
Competition between banking institutions and nonbanks is also increasing. For example,
banks frequently offer "discount brokerage services," allowing customers to buy and sell
stock, while securities firms (and other nonbanks) offer "money market accounts" with
check-writing privileges or act as insurers for credit cards. In short, the relatively clear lines of
previous years are fluid and muddied.
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treatment-mergers and acquisitions,' interlocking directorates,9
and conditional transactions.'"
I. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF REGULATION
The American banking industry is a multi-tiered system, with
variations both in the kinds of institutions providing different bank-
ing services, and in the kinds of agencies responsible for supervising
their activities." Furthermore, the industry is becoming more com-
plex as traditional banks expand their activities into nonbanking
areas at the same time that other institutions expand into areas tradi-
tionally occupied only by banks or similar institutions. 2 Some ap-
preciation of this diversity is necessary to understand the different
standards under the antitrust laws to which banking institutions may
occasionally be subject. For example, not only will the merger of two
commercial banks be reviewed by a different agency than the merger
of two savings and loan associations, but the standards these agen-
cies apply to determine whether there is an antitrust violation may
differ as well.
Banking services are provided both by commercial banks and by
thrift institutions. In turn, both of these kinds of institutions may be
regulated by the federal and/or a state government.
A "bank" is defined as "any institution . . which (1) accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand,
and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans."' 3
Commercial banks, in turn, fall into one of four categories:
8. See generally infra notes 33-147 and accompanying text.
9. See generally infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text.
10. See generally infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
II. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 641-46 (2d
ed. 1984); D. COHEN & R. FREIER, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM (1980); J. NORTON
& S. WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL (1985); W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE, J. COOPER, & S.
CHAZIN, BANKING LAW (1985); Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pts. 1-2), 52 VA. L.
REV. 565, 771 (1966); Norton, Perspectives on the United States' Banking System, 12 ANGLO-
AM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
12. See supra note 7. This article will consider the application of the antitrust laws only to
traditional banking institutions, even though nonbanks may perform similar functions. In ad-
dition, there are other institutions which provide some of the services of banks-finance com-
panies offer commercial loans, trust companies or other fiduciaries provide trust services, and
so forth. These companies, however, are subject to considerably less regulation than banks,
and thus should be subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent as the member of any
unregulated industry.
See generally Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S.
Ct. 681 (1986) (Federal Reserve Board exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating
regulation to expand definition of "bank" to include certain "nonbank banks").
13. 12 U.S.C. § 184(c) (1982). Thrift institutions have recently been given authority to of-
fer demand deposit accounts. Their loans, however, are only infrequently of a general com-
mercial nature.
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"federal" or "national" banks, and three types of state banks; each
of these types is supervised and regulated by different bodies.
First, national banks are chartered pursuant to federal law"' by the
Comptroller of the Currency ("Comptroller"), and are required to
become members of the Federal Reserve System. As a result, they
are regulated both by the Comptroller and by the Federal Reserve
Board.' 5 Second, there are banks chartered under the laws of a state
which have chosen to become members of the Federal Reserve
System; these "state member banks," while not regulated by the
Comptroller, are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board as well as
by a state regulatory authority. 6 Third, there are state banks which,
while not choosing to be members of the Federal Reserve System,
have elected to provide insurance to their depositors through the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"); these "state
nonmember insured banks" are regulated both by the FDIC and by
state authorities. 7 Fourth, there are state banks which do not pro-
vide federal insurance to depositors; these "state non-member unin-
sured banks"' 8 are regulated only by state authorities.
The term "thrift institution" is used to describe financial institu-
tions which do not share all the characteristics of commercial banks
(although in the past decade, legislation has authorized them to
undertake far more activities than a traditional nonbank).19 Thrift
institutions fall into three categories-savings and loan associations,
mutual savings banks, and cooperative banks or "credit unions."
Within each of these three groups, further divisions can be made
based on whether the institution is federally or state chartered, and
the degree of federal involvement.
Savings and loan associations are nonmutual and noncooperative,
i.e., they are not owned by their members, but rather are organized
to earn a profit for their stockholders. These institutions originally
14. Id. §§ 21-216.
15. Id. National banks also provide insurance for their depositors through the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but they are not directly regulated by that agency.
16. As with national banks, see supra note 15, state member banks also provide insurance
through the FDIC to their depositors, but they too are not regulated directly by that agency.
17. This tripartite responsibility over these different types of banks is specified with
respect to bank mergers in 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1982). See also id. § 1813q (1982 & Supp. III
(1986)) (activities of Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.); id. § 1882 (responsibility for security
measures); id. § 3206 (enforcement of prohibitions on certain interlocking directorates).
18. In fact, these "uninsured" banks may provide insurance afforded by a state agency
or other body.
19. As noted above, see supra note 7, thrift institutions may offer demand accounts hav-
ing most of the earmarks of a commercial bank checking account. In addition, the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), provides thrift institutions with significantly
enhanced powers formerly characteristic only of commercial banks, including the ability to
engage in commercial lending.
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were formed to provide financing for the building and purchase of
homes; they did not offer demand deposits, and did not make or-
dinary commercial loans. Savings and loan associations can be
chartered either under federal law"0 or at the state level. If federally
chartered, they are regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
("FHLBB") 2' and its subordinate agency, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC").2 As with commercial
banks, state chartered savings and loan associations fall into three
categories-those which are members of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System, 3 subject to regulation by both the FHLBB and state
authorities; those which do not choose to become members of the
system but seek federal insurance," ' and thus are subject to regula-
tion by the FSLIC and state authorities; and those which choose no
federal affiliation, and thus are subject only to state regulation.
Mutual savings banks do not have capital stock represented by
shares; rather, ownership of the institution is by the depositors.
These savings banks, which were organized originally to provide
home financing, can be chartered either under federal or state law. If
the institution is federally chartered," it is subject, like a federal sav-
ings and loan institution, to regulation by the FHLBB. The FDIC
provides federal insurance for state mutual savings banks,26 and
these banks are subject to regulation by that agency as well as by
state authorities.
Cooperative banks, or credit unions, are also organized and
operated mutually, and without any capital stock or profit-making
motive. Although they have many of the powers of a commercial
bank to lend money and afford demand deposits, membership in the
cooperative bank is limited by some common bond of occupation,
association, or residential location.2 The chartering of a federal
credit union falls within the jurisdiction of the National Credit
Union Administration ("NCUA"); supervision is by the Ad-
ministration and the National Credit Union Administration Board.2 8
20. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982) (federal home loan banks); id. §§ 1461-1470
(federal savings and loan association).
21. See generally id. §§ 1437-1439.
22. See generally id. §§ 1724-1730(g).
23. See generally id. § 1424(a).
24. See generally id. § 1726(a)(2).
25. See generally id. § 1424.
26. See generally id. §§ 1811-1832. This, as will be noted from the text accompanying
note 17, supra, is the same coverage as for a state commercial bank, and differs from in-
surance for a state savings and loan association, which is provided by the FSLIC.
27. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1982) ("Federal credit union membership shall be limited
to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-
defined neighborhood, community, or rural district."). See generally Rogow & Edmonds,
Credit Unions: Competition by Statute, 97 BANKING L.J. 426 (1980).
28. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790 (1982).
1987]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
Because Congress has authorized the Board to create and operate a
National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, state chartered credit
unions may seek to provide this insurance to their members through
the NCUA Central Liquidity Facility.2 9 As a result, the NCUA and
its Board also regulate some of the credit unions' activities.
II. PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES OBTAINING SPECIAL
TREATMENT-GENERAL
The majority of activities by banks has been analyzed similarly to
comparable activities by other unregulated institutions. Thus, if
banks engage in price fixing, concerted refusals to deal, or other pro-
hibited conduct, no automatic exemption from the antitrust laws ex-
ists, and the conduct will be tested by generally prevailing
standards.3"
A few activities, however, have been deemed to affect the balance
between the twin goals of ensuring the safety of banking institutions
and their depositors, and promoting the goals of competition, and
variations from the otherwise prevailing standards are appropriate.
In some cases the antitrust strictures are relaxed, as in the case of
mergers which may injure competition but which will have an offset-
ting benefit to the community and the customers served by the merg-
ing institutiuons.31 In other cases, more stringent standards will ap-
ply; for example, certain conditional transactions which might not
be condemned for most industries are prohibited to banking institu-
tions.32 The balance of this article will consider the special treatment
under the antitrust laws that has been given to these particular ac-
tivities by banking companies.
III. MERGERS
A. Applicable Statutes- Commercial Banks
There was originally some doubt about the issue, but it is now set-
29. Id. § 1781(a).
30. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1973) (concerted refusal to deal), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974), noted in, Note,
Antitrust-Group Boycotts Refusal to Apply the Per Se Rule In the Worthen Case, 27 ARK. L.,
REV. 722 (1973); Brett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) (con-
spiracy to enforce unlawful "due on sale" clauses); Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640 (D. Kan. 1979) (concerted refusal to deal), aff'd, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,530 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Citicorp. v.
Interbank Card Ass'n, 478 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concerted refusal to deal);.
Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (price fixing); Bichel Optical
Labs, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1971) (price discrimination).
31. See infra notes 33-147 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text.
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tied that mergers by banking institutions33 are subject to the general
antitrust provisions regarding mergers and acquisitions3"-section 1
of the Sherman Act" and, of far greater significance, section 7 of the
Clayton Act.36 Several factors, however, alter the analysis of pro-
posed acquisitions. On one hand, the loss of competition between
banks may have even greater adverse effects on the community and
the economy than similar transactions in unregulated sectors; thus,
particular vigilance to prevent concentration of banking resources is
appropriate. On the other hand, the merger of relatively small banks
to form a larger and sounder financial institution can have important
advantages to the banks' customers and to the economy.3" Special
legislation exists, therefore, which adds additional supervision of
proposed bank mergers by the appropriate regulatory agencies, but
which may also result in the application of different standards to
these transactions. 8 These statutes, the Bank Merger Act of 19609
33. See generally Austin, The Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger Antitrust Law, 36
Bus. LAW. 297 (1981); Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greeley, What?, 90
BANKING L.J. 362 (1973); Carter, Commercial Banking and the Antitrust Laws, 11 ANTITRUST
BULL. 141 (1966); Casson & Burrus, Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, 18 AM. U.L. REV.
677 (1969); Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, .14 B.C. INDUS. &
COMM. L. REv. 213 (1972); Klebaner, Potential Competition in Banking and the Supreme
Court, 92 BANKING L.J. 545 (1975); Lifland, Banking Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 42
NOTRE DArmE L. REv. 465 (1967); O'Connell, Bank Mergers and Potential Competition, 43
FORDMLAM L. REV. 767 (1975); Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory
of Oligopoly, 89 BANKING L.J. 116 (1972); Vartanian, Potential Competition and Bank Mergers:
Defense Blueprint for the 1980's, 99 BANKING L.J. 882 (1982).
34. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
36. Id. § 18. See generally United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. f986)
(possible preemptive effect by Sherman and Clayton Acts of state laws regulating bank
mergers).
37. The advantages to competition and to the community from bank mergers are often
similar to those from mergers in unregulated sectors, but sometimes they may also transcend
them. Of course, mergers by smaller banks can enable them better to compete with larger in-
stitutions, affording better management opportunities, economies of scale, and so forth.
Larger banks may offer a greater variety of customer services, or be able to diversify their
loans and investments. The merger of a weak bank with another institution will protect its
depositors from potential loss, a larger concern in the banking industry than would be the
demise of a "failing company" in another industry. In addition, mergers can aid depositors
and borrowers in special ways. The lending capacity of banks is limited by a variety of state
and federal laws. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) (1982). As a result of a merger, the new institu-
tion can offer larger loans to individual customers, who might otherwise have to turn to banks
in other areas of the country. But see Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 370-71 (rejecting
argument). Similarly, statutory prohibitions on branch banking may make mergers the only
way in which a bank can engage in geographic expansion. See United States v. Marine Bancor-
poration, 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (upholding merger where state law prohibited banks from open-
ing branches in geographic areas distant from home office).
38. See generally Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 628-29.
39. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1982 & Supp. III (1986))). The legislative history of this statute may be found in H.R. REP.
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and the Bank Merger Act of 1966,1 specify detailed procedures for
review of bank mergers and identify additional factors, beyond the
standard Sherman and Clayton Act provisions, to be considered in
that review.
The applicability of section 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers
was resolved by the landmark Supreme Court decision, United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank.' The statute generally makes
unlawful certain anticompetitive stock acquisitions; it also makes
unlawful similar asset acquisitions, but only by corporations subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. Since the FTC
has no jurisdiction over banks, 2 it is clear that section 7 does not ap-
ply to asset acquistions.13 Because section 7 makes no reference to
''mergers" (nor to "consolidations")," it was uncertain whether the
Clayton Act applied to bank mergers. In Philadelphia Bank, the
Court, based on an examination of legislative history, legislative in-
tent, and principles of statutory construction, concluded that the
exclusion in section 7 respecting corporations subject to FTC
jurisdiction applied only to asset acquistions. Other transactions, in-
cluding mergers and consolidations, were held to be within the pur-
view of the Clayton Act. 5 Then, in a case decided in the following
Term, the Court held that section 1 of the Sherman Act also applies
to bank mergers. 6
No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1995-2008.
40. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982)).
41. 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see also United States v. Chelsea Sav. Bank, 300 F. Supp. (D.
Conn. 1969) (Clayton § 7 also applies to acquisitions of (nonstock) mutual savings banks).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1982); Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 336 & n.il.
43. 374 U.S. at 336.
44. See id. at 332 n.7.
45. "[Tlhe specific exception for acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's
jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets acquisitions by such corporations
when not accomplished by merger." Id. at 342.
The Court's holding that Clayton Act § 7 applied to bank mergers sparked two dissents, one
by Justice Harlan (joined by Justice Stewart), see id. at 373-96, the other by Justice Goldberg,
see id. at 396-97. Since Justice White took no part in the decision of the case, the holding was
the product of a 5-3 split in the Court.
In light of the Court's determination that § 7 reached this transaction, it was unnecessary to
"reach the further question of alleged violation of § I of the Sherman Act." Id. at 324. For
cases that did decide the issue relating to a violation of § I of the Sherman Act, see infra note
46 and accompanying text.
46. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964); see
also United States v. Central State Bank, 564 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Mich. 1973); United States
v. Owensboro Nat'l Bank, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,789 (W.D. Ky. 1972). See generally
Klebaner, The Lexington Merger Decision arid Its Significance for Commercial Banking, 1I
ANTITRUST BULL. 897 (1966).
Some cases are brought under both Clayton § 7 and Sherman § 1, with courts applying
similar standards of legality under both statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 263 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Mo. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 27 (1967); United States v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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In the Philadelphia Bank case, the Supreme Court further held
that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not diminish the scope of the
general antitrust laws in challenging bank mergers, nor did it affect
the jurisdictional reach of the courts in weighing such challenges.
The 1960 Act had established a procedure for administrative review
(and approval) of bank mergers. The Act required the written con-
sent of the appropriate agency, according to the tripartite respon-
sibility described above, 7 prior to any bank merger or consolidation.
In order to obtain uniformity in applying the standards, the Act re-
quired that, prior to making the determination, the agency was to
obtain recommendations from the other two named agencies and
from the Attorney General. In its decisionmaking process, the
responsible agency was required to weigh a number of factors, in-
cluding "the convenience and needs of the community to be served"
and "the effect of the transaction on competition (including any
tendency toward monopoly)." 8
The Court in Philadelphia Bank held that the existence of the
Bank Merger Act did not immunize bank mergers from general and
unaltered antitrust scrutiny. Immunity from the antitrust laws is to
be granted only in limited cases and only when necessary to prevent
disruption of the regulatory structure. Regulation of banks is far
more limited than that of other industries; immunity is hardly
necessary to effectuate that limited regulation; and the two statutory
schemes, the antitrust laws and the Bank Merger Act, do not reflect
unrelated or inconsistent policy- goals. 9 Indeed, the Court was so
committed to the application of the antitrust regime that, in dictum,
it even rejected the possible application of the "primary
jurisdiction" doctrine, because the input of the agencies would be of
limited impact or utility, and would serve only to attenuate or
postpone the determination of the merits."
Partly in response to the Supreme Court's rejection in
Philadelphia Bank of any special treatment for mergers involving
banking institutions, Congress amended the Bank Merger Act in
19 66 .S The revised statute provides more detailed criteria for the ap-
47. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Responsibility for reviewing proposed
mergers is divided among the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982).
49. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-55.
50. Id. at 353-54.
51. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982)). For the
legislative history of this statute, see H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. 1860-87; some of this history is also described in
United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 263 F. Supp. 125, 128-32 (N.D. Cal. 1966); see
also Searls & Reasoner, The Bank Merger Act of 1966-Ifts Strange and Fruitless Odyssey, 25
Bus. L. 133 (1969); Comment, The 1966 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 66 COLUM. L.
19871
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plication of antitrust considerations to bank mergers. Perhaps more
significantly, it also requires the agencies and the courts to consider
factors beyond the mere impact on competition of the transaction in
determining their legality under the antitrust laws, and further pro-
vides that failure by the Justice Department to initiate a challenge to
a merger within a short period of time after its approval by the
responsible agency will foreclose a subsequent attack on the merger.
The 1966 Act preserved the basic procedure specified in the 1960
Bank Merger Act. Responsibility for reviewing and approving a pro-
posed merger continues to be divided among three governmental
bodies," with the responsible agency seeking input from the At-
torney General and the other two agencies, in an attempt to achieve
uniform standards 3
In a sense, the 1966 Act provides a two-step process for the evalua-
tion of a proposed acquisition. First, it specifies, in somewhat more
detail than the 1960 Act, the balancing of the adverse effect on com-
petition that the agency should undertake. Second, it provides that,
unlike a merger in another setting, even an anticompetitive bank
merger may be approved if the responsible agency "finds that the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the tran-
saction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served.""
In the Philadelphia Bank case, the Court concluded that approval
by the responsible agency was irrelevant to a subsequent judicial
challenge. It held that the antitrust laws applied with full force to
bank mergers, and that agency approval pursuant to the Bank
Merger Act of 1960 did not foreclose full, de novo review of the
transaction under the different standards of the antitrust laws. 5 The
1966 Act, however, contains two additional provisions which affect
judicial challenges to a proposed acquisition. First, the transaction
must be challenged by the Justice Department within a short time of
its approval by the responsible agency-normally within thirty
REV. 764 (1966), reprinted in 83 BANKINo L.J. 753 (1966); Note, A Legislative History of
the 1960 Bank Merger Act and Its 1966 Amendment; Judicial Misuse and a Suggested Approach,
44 IND. L.J. 596 (1969); Legislation, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act: Economic
Perspective and Legal Analysis, 20 VAND. L. REV. 200 (1966).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1982); see also supra note 17.
53. The Act also provides for publication of a notice of the proposed transaction in
newspapers in the community where the transaction will take place, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(3),
although no requirement of public hearing, or even consideration of the comments received
from the public, is found in the statute. But see Bank Regulations Employ Distinct Com-
petitive Analyses for Mergers, 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 802 (Apr. 4, 1985).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1982).
55. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. 350-55; see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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days.56 Second, a court is to apply the same standards as those used
by the agency. That means, of course, that a court must weigh the
"convenience and needs defense" even in a merger which has other-
wise clear anticompetitive effects."
At about the same time that the Bank Merger Act was amended in
19668 to prescribe procedural requirements and substantive stan-
dards for bank mergers,59 the Bank Holding Company Act of 195661
also was revised to incorporate virtually identical procedures and
standards6' with respect to bank holding company transactions.62
The statutory requirements apply to a variety of transactions, in-
cluding the acquisition by a bank holding company of a bank or its
assets, the merger with another bank, or the conversion of a bank in-
to the subsidiary of a bank holding company. 63
All such transactions involving bank holding companies must be
approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The Board must give notice to, and then receive input from, the
Comptroller of the Currency for national banks or the appropriate
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7) (1982). In normal cases, the transaction may not be consum-
mated before 30 days after the date of approval by the agency. However, if the responsible
agency determines that there is an emergency requiring expeditious action (and so notifies the
Attorney General and the other two banking agencies), then the transaction may be consum-
mated five days after the approval by that agency. Id. § 1828(c)(6). In any event, any action by
the Justice Department to challenge the merger must be brought within that statutory period;
otherwise, "the transaction may not thereafter be attacked in any judicial proceeding on the
ground that it alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than [Sher-
man Act] section 2." Id. § 1828(c)(7)(C). If an action is brought by the Justice Depart-
ment within the 30 (or five) day period, consummation of the transaction is automatically
stayed unless the court provides otherwise. Id. § 1828(c)(7)(A); see also infra notes 67-68, 113
(discussing stay provision).
57. "In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger transaction approved [by the respon-
sible agency], . . . the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the
banking agencies are directed to apply .... 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(B) (1982). The statute also
provides that if an action challenging the merger is brought by the Department of Justice, the
approving federal supervisory agency (and any state banking supervisory agency having jurisdic-
tion within the state involved) may intervene as a party as a matter of right. Id. §
1828(c)(7)(D).
58. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1982)).
59. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
60. Act of May 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 54-511, 70 Stat. 133-146 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1982)).
61. See Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (5th Cir.
1981) (legislative history evidences intent to adopt identical standards).
62. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236-240 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1841, 1842, 1843, 1848, 1849 (1982 & Supp. III (1986))). A "bank holding company" is defined
as "any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes
a bank holding company." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(l) (1982).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). See generally Note, The Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (1971).
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supervisory authority for state banks." The substantive standards
that the Board must weigh are identical to those governing banks, 65
including the defense of the "probable effect of the transaction in
meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served." 66 As with banking institution transactions,67 any challenge
to a bank holding company acquisition must be instituted within a
relatively short, defined period;66 furthermore, in any judicial
challenge, the court, while reviewing de novo the issues presented, is
required to apply the same standards to the transaction as those con-
sidered by the Board.69
B. Varying Standards of Legality-Commercial Banks
In light of this dual statutory regime-the general antitrust laws
(the Sherman and Clayton Acts) apply to bank mergers, but the
Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act specify dif-
ferent review procedures and different substantive standards-a
number of related questions arise. How should the proposed merger
of banking institutions be tested under the antitrust laws? How do
the special banking statutes alter the substantive standards? Should
the proposed merger of two banks be subjected to higher thresholds?
How are the defenses identified in these statutes balanced against
general antitrust considerations?
Since its Philadelphia National Bank"0 decision, the Supreme
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982); cf. id. § 1828(c)(2) (divides responsibility for approving
bank mergers among Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation).
65. See id. § 1828(c)(5) (discussed supra text accompanying note 54).
66. Id. § 1842(c).
67. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Vial v. First Commerce Corp.,
564 F. Supp. 650, 665-68 (E.D. La. 1983) (automatic stay provision in Bank Merger Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1982), applies only to government actions, and not to challenges by
private individuals); First Midland Bank & Trust Co. v. Chemical Fin. Corp., 441 F. Supp.
414, 421-23 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (same) (supplemental opinion); cf. United States v. National Bank
& Trust Co., 3,19 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (stockholder of one of two merging trust com-
panies may not intervene as a matter of right under FED. R. Civ. P. 24 to set aside consent
decree between banks and federal government).
68. See United States v. Michigan Nat'l Corp., 419 U.S. 1 (1974) (challenge to bank
holding company transaction requiring approval of both Federal Reserve Board and Comp-
troller of the Currency may be brought immediately upon approval by one agency without
waiting for possible disapproval by other agency; thirty day period for filing suit might be trig-
gered by first approval, making later challenge after second agency's action untimely).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1982); see also infra note 117; cf. Central Nat'l Bank v. Rain-
bolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 1983) (national bank and chairman of its board of
directors lack standing to raise anticompetitive concerns in challenge to acquisition of national
bank by principal stockholder of a bank holding company).
70. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
[Vol. 35
ALTERED ANTITRUST STANDARDS
Court has consistently taken the position that the general antimerger
statutes govern commercial banking.7' The same method of analysis
used for acquisitions in unregulated sectors of the economy will ap-
ply to bank acquisitions as well.72 Thus, one must first determine the
relevant markets-the product market and the geographic
market-within which the transaction may diminish competition.
Then, applying appropriate theories-based in large part on whether
the acquisition involves a horizontal merger or a geographic exten-
sion merger-one must determine what the probable effect on com-
petition will be.
1. Product Market
The Philadelphia Bank case involved the proposed merger of the
second and third largest commercial banks in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area. In evaluating the legality of the transaction, the
Court held that "the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and
services (such as checking accounts and trust administration)
denoted by the term 'commercial banking' . . . comprises a distinct
line of commerce ' 73 for section 7 purposes.74 The Court's conclu-
sion was based on the uniqueness of some of these services, for ex-
ample, checking accounts, which were not offered by any other
financial institutions; on the cost advantages that commercial banks
enjoyed with respect to other services for which competition existed,
for example, making personal loans; and on consumer preferences
for the provision of certain services by commercial banks, for exam-
ple, savings deposits, even though other institutions competed fully
and freely in these areas."
71. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1974);
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 353 (1970); United States
v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 181-83, (1968); see also United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120-22 (1975).
72. See generally IV E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW chs. 33-38 (1984).
73. 374 U.S. at 356.
74. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 663 (1974) ("the absence
of a 'line of commerce' phrase in the Bank Merger Act of 1966 [does not] alter[] traditional
standards under § 7 of the Clayton Act for defining the relevant product market in a bank
merger case.").
75. See 374 U.S. at 356-57. The Court noted "that many other institutions are in the
business of supplying credit, and so more or less in competition with commercial banks ...
for example: mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, personal-
finance companies, sales-finance companies, private businessmen (through the furnishing of
trade credit), factors, direct-lending government agencies, the Post Office, Small Business In-
vestment Corporations, life insurance companies." Id. at 327 n.5. See generally Weston &
Hoskins, "Line of Commerce" and Commercial Banking, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1969).
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A broader definition of the relevant product market, to include
other financial institutions offering the same products and services,
would result in the approval under the Clayton Act of a greater
number of bank mergers.7" The Supreme Court, however, has
adhered to its Philadelphia Bank holding that commercial banking is
itself a relevant market for analytical purposes,7" even in the face of
suggestions that some commercial bank mergers should be treated
differently. Thus, in United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank &
Trust Co. ," which involved the merger of two very small banks in a
small community, 9 the district court had concluded that since these
commercial banks functioned in many ways like savings banks, those
institutions should be included within the relevant product market.8"
The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion and repeated its prior
holding that the products and services offered by corumercial banks
were sufficiently unique as to make commercial banking a "distinct
line of commerce," or a "relevant market," for testing the legality
of a merger of two such institutions.8'
More recently, several commentators have suggested that recent
financial and legislative developments require a redefinition of the
relevant product market for evaluating mergers of commercial
banks. 2 The passage in 1980 of the Depository Institutions
76. The larger the product market, the smaller the percentage market share of that
market which will be accounted for by the two firms whose transaction is under scrutiny.
Given the great importance given to this resultant market share, see infra notes 99-102 and ac-
companying text, this diminished percentage will enhance the likelihood of agency and judicial
approval of the merger.
77. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618-19 & n.16 (1974);
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 182 n.15. (1968).
78. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
79. "(Mjeasured by trust assets, the Phillipsburg National Bank in 1968 ranked 1346th
and the Second National Bank of Phillipsburg 2429th out of the approximately 3100 banks
with trust powers in the United States. If the two banks were merged, the resulting bank would
have ranked 1323d-only 23 places ahead of the Phillipsburg National alone." Id. at
373-74 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). The
geographic market used to test the merger was a "metropolis" of less than 90,000 people. See
id. at 362-65.
80. 306 F. Supp. 645, 646-51 (D.N.J. 1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
81. 399 U.S. at 359-62; see also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656,
660-66 (1974); cf. United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1290-92 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) (using similar analysis to evaluate individual defendant's joint control of two
rural banks, challenged under Sherman § 1).
82. See, e.g., Alcaly & Nelson, Will Including Thrifts in the Banking Market Affect
Mergers?, 97 BANKING L.J. 346 (1980); Austin, The Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger
Antitrust Law, 36 Bus. LAW. 297, 366-67 (1981); Bleier & Eisenbeis, Commercial Banking
As the "Line of Commerce" and the Role of Thrifts, 98 BAN.IoG L.J. 374 (1981); Jung, Banking
Mergers and "Line of Commerce" After the Monetary Control Act: A Submarket Approach,
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Deregulation and Monetary Control Act83-better known as the
Omnibus Banking Bill of 1980-significantly expands the oppor-
tunities for other financial institutions to engage in activities former-
ly limited only to commercial banks. For example, the Philadelphia
Bank Court relied in part on the fact that only commercial banks
could offer checking accounts; today, however, thrift institutions
can offer interest-bearing demand accounts,84 and credit unions can
offer "share draft accounts," which also pay interest and closely
resemble checking accounts. Other changes in the economy and
governing statutes, ranging from the offering of money market ac-
counts by securities firms to the removal of restrictions on the
amount of interest that financial institutions can pay to their
customers, further reduce the uniqueness or commercial advantage
of the products and services offered by commercial banks. In fact,
several district courts have held that the relevant product market in
assessing bank mergers should be larger than simply commercial
banking;85 the Supreme Court, while not yet overruling its prior
decisions, has itself indicated that under proper circumstances a
broader product market definition might be appropriate.86
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 731; Via, Commercial Banking As the "Line of Commerce" in Bank
Amalgamations: A Reexamination, 99 BANKING L.J. 326 (1982); Note, The Line of Com-
merce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REV.
907 (1983).
83. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
84. These are often offered under the acronym "NOW" accounts, standing for
"negotiated order of withdrawal."
85. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 281 (D. Conn. 1973),
vacated, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, 329 F. Supp. 1003,
1017 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd 410 U.S. 577 (1973); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 651-55 (D.N.J. 1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970); see also United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 379-82 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
86. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 666. The Court stated:
We do not say, and Phillipsburg National Bank .. .and Philadelphia National
Bank ... do not say, that in a case involving a merger of commercial banks a court
may never consider savings banks and commercial banks as operating in the same
line of commerce, no matter how similar their services and economic behavior. At
some stage in the development of savings banks it will be unrealistic to distinguish
them from commercial banks for purposes of the Clayton Act. In Connecticut, that
point may well be reached when and if savings banks become significant par-
ticipants in the marketing of bank services to commercial enterprises. But, in
adherence to the tests set forth in our earlier bank merger casese, which we are con-
strained to follow, we hold that such a point has not yet been reached.
Id. But see United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793, 810-11
(D.N.J. 1980) (developments since Connecticut Nat'l Bank still not enough to expand rele-
vant market beyond commercial banking).
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2. Geographic Market
In evaluating the impact on competition of a proposed bank
merger, courts must also determine the relevant "section of the
country"-the geographic market-within which to test the transac-
tion. Unlike the determination of the relevant product market,
where courts have not made distinctions based on the type of merger
in question, the definition of the relevant geographic market will de-
pend in part on whether the acquisition involves a horizontal
merger-two banks formerly in competition with one another-or a
geographic extension merger.
In Philadelphia Bank, a horizontal merger case, the Court pro-
vided a test for determining the relevant geographic market: "The
proper question to be asked in this case is not where the parties to
the merger do business or even where they compete, but where,
within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on
competition will be direct and immediate."I 7 Since the principal con-
cern in a horizontal merger is the injury to those customers who no
longer obtain the benefits of the competition that previously existed
between the parties to the merger, it is relevant to determine where
those customers operated and where they can turn for alternatives.
In the banking industry, the difficulty of making this determination
is compounded by the varying size and nature of the banks'
customers; therefore, some compromise or intermediate approxima-
tion is needed. The surrogate will often be the place where the banks'
offices are located, and the areas in which the bulk of their business
originates. 8
This general approach to determining the relevant market was
repeated in the Phillipsburg Bank case. s9 In that case, the merging
banks operated in a small community that was part of a somewhat
larger region. The district court had broadly defined the relevant
market as the larger metropolitan area, but the Supreme Court re-
jected that definition. The Court looked particularly to "the market
area in which [the two banks] operate, and . . . the area in which
most of the merging banks' customers must, or will, do their bank-
ing. ' 9° The Court stressed the narrowness with which the market
87. 374 U.S. at 357; accord, Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 667-68.
88. 374 U.S. at 357-62; see also Southwest Miss. Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp. 1, 8-14
(S.D. Miss. 1979), aff'd mem., 625 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. United States v. Central
State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1292-94 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (using similar anslysis to evaluate
individual defendant's joint control of two rural banks challenged under Sherman § 1).
89. 399 U.S. at 362-65, noted in, Note, U.S. v. Phillipsburg National Bank: A Considera-
tion of Commercial Banking as the Relevant Line of Commerce in Small Bank Situations,
46 IND. L.J. 348 (1971).
90. Id. at 365.
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could be delineated, especially when the merger occurred in a small
geographic area: "Commercial realities in the banking industry
make clear that banks generally have a very localized business;"" l
these localized operations justified the conclusion that even limited
areas are "clearly an economically significant section of the country
for the purposes of § 7.' 92
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 9 the Supreme Court
considered the Justice Department's challenge to the acquisition by
the second largest bank in Seattle, Washington, of the third largest
bank in Spokane.94 The Court held that the relevant geographic
market for testing the legality of a geographic extension merger,
where the merging parties were not previously direct competitors and
one company was expanding into either a distant or an adjacent
geographic market, is the area in which the acquired company
operates. 5 While conceding that this was a relevant market, the
Goverment had argued that the entire State of Washington was also
a "section of the country" for section 7 purposes. The Court re-
jected this alternative, and instead favored the approach taken in
previous horizontal bank merger cases: focusing on the place where
affected customers can turn for alternatives, and where "the effect
of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate." 9
3. Effect on Competition
In assessing the impact on competition of the merger of two
banks, the transaction is not treated much differently than a merger
91. Id. at 362.
92. Id. at 365. The Court stressed that, as was also true in Philadelphia Bank, the
geographic area chosen was one that the relevant federal banking agencies-the Federal
Reserve Board and the FDIC-as well as the Attorney General deemed to be an "area of effec-
tive competition." Id. at 364; cf. 374 U.S. at 361; see also United States v. County Nat'l Bank
of Bennington, 339 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. Vt. 1972) ("Bennington area," with population of
23,733, was a relevant "section of the country"); cf. Mid-Nebraska Bancshares, Inc. v. Board
of Governors, 627 F.2d 266, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (relevant market was combination of two
adjacent small towns where banks operated, rather than two separate markets; hence, merger
was horizontal rather than geographic extension); United States v. Virginia Nat'l Bankshares,
Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982) (government failed to satisfy its
burden of proof that entire country constituted a single relevant geographic market).
93. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
94. See generally IV E. KINTNER, supra note 72, § 36.21.
95. 418 U.S. at 622 ("We hold that in a potential-competition case like this one, the rele-
vant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired
firm is an actual, direct competitor."); accord, United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418
U.S. 656, 667 (1974).
96. 418 U.S. at 619; accord, Connecticut Natl Bank, 418 U.S. at 672-73; see also United
States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793, 811-12 (D.N.J. 1980).
1987]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
in an unregulated industry,97 with the exception of the potential
allowance of the "convenience and needs" defense discussed
below.98 That banks are involved is, at best, an additional factor in
assessing the nature of the market, the importance of preserving
competition, and the possibility of achieving competitive goals by
other means (including de novo entry or expansion by one of the ex-
isting parties or entry into the market by acquiring another, smaller
bank).
Philadelphia Bank is one of the leading cases describing the
general approach to evaluating the legality of a horizontal merger.
There, the Court established a rebuttable presumption approach to
evaluating such transactions, stressing that two factors were key in
determining the merger's likely effect on competition: the percentage
share of the market controlled by the resultant merged firm and a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in the market.99
This approach was reaffirmed in the Phillipsburg Bank case' 0 and
subsequent decisions,'' and remains viable, even if modified and
refined, in the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines.'0 2
The case law indicates that, merely because the transaction in-
volves two banks, the substantive standards under section 7 of the
Clayton Act (as opposed, perhaps, to the relaxation permitted by the
Bank Merger Act) should be neither more relaxed nor more
stringent.
On one hand, in Philadelphia Bank the Court "reject[ed] the posi-
tion that commercial banking, because it is subject to a high degree
97. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The Court stated:
We think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentra-
tion of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substan-
tially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
Id. See generally Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A Product
Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907 (1983); Case Comment, 5 WM. & MARY L. REV.
280 (1964).
100. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970). See
generally Alcorn, Phillipsburg and Beyond-Developing Trends in Substantive Standards for
Bank Mergers, 9 Hous. L. REV. 417 (1972); Darnell, The Phillipsburg National Bank Case, 16
ANTITRUST BULL. 33 (1971); Note, 25 Sw. L.J. 317 (1971).
101. See, e.g., Mid-Nebraska Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 266,
270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
102. Justice Dep't Merger Guidelines, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169
(Spec. Supp.) (June 14, 1984); see United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276,
1294-95 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (using Department's Guideline standards to evaluate individual
defendant's joint control of two rural banks, challenged under Sherman § 1).
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of governmental regulation, or because it deals in the intangibles of
credit and services rather than in the manufacture or sale of tangible
commodities, is somehow immune from the anticompetitive effects
of undue concentration .... There is no reason to think that con-
centration is less inimical to the free play of competition in banking
than in other service industries. On the contrary, it is in all probabili-
ty more inimical."" 3
On the other hand, just because banks are involved, and because
permitting certain mergers might lead to additional mergers, further
concentration in already concentrated banking markets or other com-
petitive concerns do not justify more stringent standards than
those imposed by the Clayton Act. The Bank Merger Act requires
banking authorities to review the impact of such transactions on
competition, but in determining whether to approve a bank merger,
banking authorities are not required to apply more demanding stan-
dards than those imposed under section 7 and the case law inter-
preting it.' 04
103. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 368-69.
104. See Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973) (reversing
FDIC refusal to approve merger as abuse of discretionary powers). The FDIC had "determin-
ed that although banking factors were consistent with approval and the proposed merger
would not violate the antitrust laws .... the merger [violated the Bank Merger Act because it]
would be a significant precedent for approval of additional mergers in highly concentrated
markets." Id. at 461. "Congress specified that the antitrust laws be the sole competitive stan-
dard not only to insure uniformity, but also to afford the banking agencies a discernible body
of law upon which to base their decisions." Id. at 464; accord County Nat'l Bancorporation
v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusal by Federal Reserve Board to ap-
prove merger of bank holding companies exceeded standards of Bank Holding Company Act,
by considering competitive factors other than whether merger would violate antitrust laws);
Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 649 F.2d 1026, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981) (same);
Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1261-63 (5th Cir. 1981) (same);
see also United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). "First, the District Court must decide whether the merger, con-
sidered solely from an antitrust viewpoint, would violate the Clayton Act standard embodied
in the Bank Merger Act. If it would not, the inquiry is over." Id. at 193; First State Bank of
Clute v. Board of Governors, 553 F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1977) (standard of review following
approval by Federal Reserve Board of proposed acquisition). But see County Nat'l Bancor-
poration v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d 1253, 1260-64 (8th Cir. 1981) (Heaney, J., dissen-
ting) (agencies should be free to evaluate the significance of anticompetitive effects which are
not technical antitrust violations, in part to determine whether merger satisfies "convenience
and needs" of community); see also infra note 112 (discussing standard of review to be used by
court following agency disapproval of merger application). See generally Carstensen, Restric-
ting the Power to Promote Competition in Banking: A Foolish Consistency Among the Cir-
cuits, 1983 DUKE L.J. 580; Metzger & Greenfield, Agency Discretion to Deny Bank Mergers:
What Are the Limits?, 98 BANKING L.J. 838 (1981); O'Brien, Developing of Bank Regulation
and its Appropriate Competitive Standards: Grays Harbor-A Gathering Storm, 31 Bus.
LAW. 415 (1975); Note, Washington Mutual: A Judicial Amendment to the Bank Merger Act
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Coincidentally, just as Philadelphia Bank is a landmark decision
in the horizontal merger area, the leading Supreme Court decision
delineating the appropriate analysis for evaluating the legality of
geographic extension mergers also involved commercial banks. In
United States v. Marine Bancorporation,'°5 the Court described in
detail the application of the potential competition doctrine to
geographic market extension mergers. Interestingly, this doctrine,
which had been used successfully in the previous Court Term to set
aside another proposed merger,"0 6 has since Marine Bancorporation
been notably unavailing in government challenges to most such tran-
sactions. 107
This article will not deal generally with the various theories for
challenging geographic market extension mergers, and specifically
the potential competition theory."0 ' Two statements by the Court in
of 1966, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639 (1974); Note, Antitrust-Banking-Federal Reserve Board
May Not Apply Competitive Standards More Stringent Than the Antitrust Laws in Reviewing
Bank Merger Applications, 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 210 (1982).
105. 418 U.S. 602, 623-41 (1974). See generally Alcorn, Merger Analysis for Banks and
Others-Marine Bancorporation and Connecticut National Bank, 12 Hous. L. REV. 539
(1975); Meigher, Bank Mergers and the Clayton Act: Some Chips in the Doctrine of Potential
Competition, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 705 (1975); Note, Bank Mergers and Potential
Competition after Marine Bancorporation: The Role of Regulatory Entry Barriers, 5 N.M.L.
REV. 139 (1974).
106. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
107. United States v. Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871
(W.D. Va. 1982) (merger will on balance be procompetitive).
As the Court noted in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 627 n.30
(1974), the Government had been completely unsuccessful even prior to that decision in seek-
ing to have bank mergers halted based on reliance on the potential competition doctrine. See
United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. United Va. Bankshares, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
891 (E.D. Va. 1972); United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D.
Colo. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 410 U.S. 577 (1973); United States v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank,
315 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 310 F. Supp. 157 (D. Md.
1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v.
Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (three judge court); see also
Williams, New Dimensions to Bank Merger Law: The Supreme Court in the Mid-Seventies, 20
ANTITRUST BULL. 699 (1975); House Committee Examines Mergers in Banking Sector, 46 An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 968 (May 17, 1984) (current laws would be inadequate to pro-
tect against high levels of concentration if interstate banking prohibitions are lifted);
Economists Outline Study Results on Concentration, Bank Expansions, 46 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1010 (May 24, 1984) (questioning adequacy of Justice Dept. Merger
Guidelines in dealing with bank mergers). See generally Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate
Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58
B.U.L. REV. 199 (1978).
108. See generally IV E. KINTNER, supra note 72, at ch. 36; O'Brien, Legal Evolution of
Potential Competition and its Application to Banking, 30 Bus. LAW. 1181 (1975); Whitesell,
Potential Competition and Bank Mergers, 88 BANKING L.J. 387 (1971); Willacy & Willacy,
Conglomerate Bank Mergers and Clayton 7: Is Potential Competition the Answer?, 93 BANK-
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Marine Bancorporation, however, are of particular significance to
the acquisition by a bank of another bank in a different geographic
area. First, bank mergers are to be tested by the same general stan-
dards of Clayton section 7 as similar transactions in other settings,
and thus "geographic market extension mergers by commercial
banks must pass muster under the potential-competition
doctrine."" 9 Second, state and federal regulations may affect the
calculus of the transaction's probable effect on competition. A
bank's ability to expand into new areas by opening branch banks or
establishing a new banking enterprise is more limited than in a com-
pletely unregulated industry; thus, other steps which could enhance
competition are unavailable. Therefore, the Court noted that "the
application of the [potential competition] doctrine to commercial
banking must take into account the unique federal and state
regulatory restraints on entry into that line of commerce. Failure to
do so would produce misconceptions that go to the heart of the doc-
trine itself.'' 10
4. Defenses
The Bank Merger Act and its companion, the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, both provide that even an acquisition which on balance
reduces competition may be approved if the responsible supervising
ING L.J. 148 (1976); Note, Bank Mergers and Potential Competition, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 767
(1975); cf. United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793, 816 (D.N.J.
1980) (declining to extend entrenchment doctrine to commercial banking).
109. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 627; see also United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120-22 (1975), noted in Velvel, Carving Holes in the Sherman Act: A Com-
ment on the Citizens & Southern Case, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 535 (1976); Recent Decision, 10
GA. L. REV. 641 (1976); Republic of Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 649 F.2d 1026,
1044-48 (5th Cir. 1981); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1263-72
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793, 813-.16
(D.N.J. 1980); Southwest Miss. Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 499 F. Supp. 1, 14-16
(S.D. Miss. 1979), aff'd mem., 625 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally Rhoades, Impact
of Foothold Acquisitions on Bank Market Structure, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 119(1977); Vartan-
ian, Potential Competition and Bank Mergers: Defense Blueprint for the 1980's, 99 BANKING
L.J. 382 (1982).
110. 418 U.S. at 627. See generally Comment, Potential Competition in Bank Mergers
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 314 (1975); Comment, Monopolies:
Clayton Section 7 and the Potential Competition Doctrine- What Sort of Standards for Com-
mercial Banks, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 574 (1975); Note, State Banking Restrictions on De Novo
Expansion Must Be Considered in the Determination of Whether a Market Extension Merger
Between Commercial Banking Organizations is Proscribed by Federal Antitrust Legislation,
41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 711 (1975); Note, Antitrust Law-Banks-Legal Barriers to Market Entry
Means No Elimination of Potential Competition, 26 MERCER L. REV. 975 (1975); Case Com-
ment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 609 (1975); Note, Potential Competition and Bank Mergers' Recent
Supreme Court Decisions, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1372 (1975).
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agency "finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed tran-
saction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.'"I' Applying this defense to specific tran-
sactions raises both procedural and substantive issues.
The Supreme Court considered a host of procedural issues in its
first decision after the then-new Bank Merger Act of 1966. ' 2 The
Comptroller of the Currency had approved two bank mergers, which
the government challenged; in both cases the district court dismissed
the government's complaint that the mergers violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act." 3 In reversing and remanding the actions for trial,
the Supreme Court explored the Bank Merger Act's procedural ef-
fect. The court pointed out that first, a complaint is not defective for
failure to allege a violation of the Bank Merger Act and for relying
solely on the Clayton Act." The cause of action indeed arises under
the antitrust laws, and the Bank Merger Act is significant solely as a
defense. Second, since the "convenience and needs" exception in the
Bank Merger Act is a defense, the burden of pleading, and the
burden of proof of showing that the transaction "clearly" satisfies
these needs, are on the defendant banks." 3 Third, the review by the
trial court to determine whether the defense is satisfied is to be de
novo; the court need not defer to the agency decision (unlike the
review of certain administrative decisions, where the agency deter-
mination is to be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous or unsupported
by substantial evidence)." 6 Requiring adherence to an agency deter-
mination unless it was arbitrary or capricious would be a step
towards allowing the agency to confer antitrust immunity for bank
mergers-a result inconsistent with Congressional intent. " Fourth,
111. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1982) (bank mergers); id. § 1842(c)(2) (bank holding com-
pany mergers). The statutes provide that the standards to be applied by a court in reviewing
the agency's decision shall be identical, including consideration of any defenses, to those ap-
plied by the agency. Id. § 1828(c)(7)(B) (bank mergers); id. § 1849(b) (bank holding company
mergers). See generally Alcaly, Neither Convenient nor Needed: The Convenience and Needs
and Public Benefits Tests of the Bank Holding Company Act, 96 BANKING L.J. 325 (1979);
Golden, Preparing the Convenience and Needs Defense Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966,
96 BANKING L.J. 100 (1979); Recent Decision, 54 GEo. L.J. 686 (1966).
112. The Court decided two cases in the same opinion: United States v. First City Nat'l
Bank and United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), noted in, Recent Decision,
5 DuQ. L. REv. 511 (1967).
113. First City, 386 U.S. at 363.
114. Id. at 363-64.
115. Id. at 366; see also United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 192 (1968).
116. 386 U.S. at 366-68.
117. Id. at 368. The extent of any immunity for both mergers and other anticompetitive
activities as the result of agency activity again was considered in United States v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 102-11 (1975). In that action involving interpretation of the Bank
Holding Company Act, the Court stressed that the immunity that would flow from the failure
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the automatic stay provided by the statute" 8 lasts through all judicial
proceedings, and does not terminate after the district court affirms
agency approval, if judicial appeals are still pending. '
The Supreme Court considered the substantive content of the
"convenience and needs" defense in a decision in the following
Term, United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville.'20 In that
case, the second and fourth largest banks in Nashville, Tennessee,
had agreed to merge, forming what would have been the largest bank
in the area. After the Comptroller of the Currency approved the
merger, the Government challenged the transaction. The district
court upheld the merger, finding that it would not substantially
lessen competition and, in any event, any anticompetitive effect
would be outweighed by the "convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served."' 2
After first rejecting the district court's conclusion as to the lack of
anticompetitive effect, the Supreme Court considered the "conven-
ience and needs" defense.' 22 The Court recognized that "[t]he pur-
pose of the Bank Merger Act was to permit certain bank mergers
even though they tended to lessen competition in the relevant
market."' 23 The defense thus permits certain mergers notwithstand-
ing anticompetitive effects. The Court then offered an additional test
to define 'when these additional factors support approving an other-
of the Department of Justice to challenge an acquisition or merger within thirty days of its
"approval," see 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1982), applied only to "formal approval" by the Board
itself, and was inapplicable to an indication of approval by the agency staff, or its equivalent, i.e.,
the determination by the staff, after an informal review, not to bring a challenge against cer-
tain conduct. The Court also stressed that the grandfather clause in the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, see id. § 1849(d), immunized all transactions undertaken prior to July 1, 1966,
which had not been challenged by the Department of Justice, regardless of whether they ac-
tually violated the statute and regardless of whether the violation was of § 7 of the Clayton Act
or § I of the Sherman Act.
The standard of judicial review following agency disapproval of a merger applica-
tion-whether it should be de novo, as in the case of Justice Department challenges following
agency approval, or deference to the agency, setting disapproval aside only if it is arbitrary or
capricious-is unclear. Compare Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 464 (9th
Cir. 1973) (review limited to arbitrary or capricious decisions or abuse of discretion) with
Southwest Miss. Bank v. FDIC, 499 F. Supp. 1, 15-16 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (de novo review).-
118. See 23 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1982) (bank mergers); id. § 1849(b) (bank holding
company mergers); see also supra notes 56, 67 and accompanying text.
119. 386 U.S. at 370-71.
120. 390 U.S. 171 (1968), noted in, Note, Trade Regulation-Mergers-Bank Merger Act
of 1966, 36 TENN. L. REV. 833 (1969).
121. Id. at 173-76.
122. Id. at 181-84.
123. Id. at 184. "Congress felt that the role of banks in a community's economic life was
such that the public interest would sometimes be served by a bank merger even though the
merger lessened competition." Id.
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wise anticompetitive merger. The Court's overarching standard was:
"The public interest was the ultimate test imposed." 1 2 4
In applying this revised test, the Court examined the two justifica-
tions most frequently used to support the "convenience and needs"
defense: the increased lending limit which the larger resultant bank
would enjoy after the merger, and the rescue of the weaker acquired
bank, which would otherwise be unable to provide adequate services
for its customers and indeed might be in risk of financial failure.
While the Court recognized the increased lending limit as a rele-
vant consideration, it found that a simple assertion that the lending
limit would be higher was not enough to support the "convenience
and needs" defense.1 2 A court cannot simply presume that an in-
crease will always have important benefits to the banks' customers
and to the community at large. Rather, the acquiring bank must of-
fer evidence of some direct relationship between the higher limit and
a benefit to the community and must show the value of this par-
ticular benefit compared to the other results of the merger.1 26
That the acquired bank was weak or marginally successful is also
not sufficient to justify its acquisition by a larger rival, especially
when the result will be just a few large banks in a concentrated
market. It is true that the "convenience and needs" defense relaxes
the standard from that of the "failing company doctrine" in the
unregulated sectors of the economy.1 2 ' Nonetheless, the defendant-
124. Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted:
It is plain that Congress considered both competition in commercial banking and
satisfaction of the "convenience and needs of the community" to be in the public
interest. It concluded that a merger should be judged in terms of its overall effect
upon the public interest. If a merger posed a choice between preserving competition
and satisfying the requirements of convenience and need, the injury and benefit
were to be weighed and decision was to rest on which alternative better served the
public interest.
Id. at 185. This additional test could add new confusion rather than resolve the ambiguity of
the statute.
125. Id. at 186. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the
Court expressly rejected this defense, finding that it had "no statutory authorization for con-
sidering such a benefit in appraising the legality of a merger. Expressions in Congress during
consideration of the 1966 Act suggest that one purpose of the Act was to give this factor, ...
suitable weight in judging [bank mergers'] validity." Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. at 186 (citing
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 370-71).
126. See 390 U.S. at 186. The trial court must be "specific in describing the beneficial
consequences . . . for the ... community, or in defining the value of these additions, especial-
ly as compared with the other, and less desirable, results of the merger. Absent such findings,
the increased lending capacity of the new bank weighs little in the balance." Id.
127. Id. at 187. "Congress was also concerned about banks in danger of collapse-banks
not so deeply in trouble as to call forth the traditional 'failing company' defense, but
nonetheless in danger of becoming before long financially unsound institutions." Id.
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acquiring bank must at least show that the improvements in the un-
successful bank's situation could not be achieved by less anti-
competitive means, including its acquisition by a smaller bank or the
introduction of new management.' 28
The application of the "convenience and needs" defense was ex-
plored again in the Phillipsburg Bank case.' 29 There, the Court's ma-
jor focus was on the geographic area in which to determine whether
the anticompetitive effects of the merger were outweighed by other
benefits. Rejecting the district court's use of a larger geographic area
to evaluate the effect on competition than to evaluate the defense,
the Court held that the asserted "convenience and needs" can not be
assessed only in a segment of the community where the anti-
competitive effect will be felt. While the "convenience and needs"
benefit may on occasion be conferred in an area larger than the area
adversely affected, the area benefitted can never be smaller than the
area suffering the adverse impact.' 30
In light of the more serious impact of a bank failure than failure ili the unregulated sector,
the "convenience and needs" defense is more liberal and thus subsumes the failing company
doctrine. See generally Via, Antitrust and the Rescue of Distressed Banks by Acquisition, 94
BANKING L.J. 508 (1977); IV E. KINTNER, supra note 72, §§ 34.12, 35.24, 36.20 (discussing
failing company doctrine).
128. 390 U.S. at 190. "[Blefore the merger injurious to the public interest is approved, a
showing [must] be made that the gain expected from the merger cannot reasonably be expected
through other means." Id.
In United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970), the Court not
only repeated these requirements, but added an additional wrinkle:
Beyond careful consideration of alternative methods of serving the convenience and
needs of [the affected community], the [district] court should deal specifically with
whether the proposed merger is likely to benefit all seekers of banking services in the
community, rather than simply those interested in large loan and trust services.
Id. at 372; see also Mid-Nebraska Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 266,
271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting defense).
129. 399 U.S. at 369-73.
130. Id. at 371-72. The Court stated:
[Tihe geographic market-the "community which that particular sought-to-be
merged bank services"-is the area in which convenience and needs must be
evaluated. Commercial realities, moreover, make clear that the "community to be
served" is virtually always as large, or larger, than the geographic market. . ..
[T]he clear congressional purpose in the Bank Merger Act [was] that convenience
and needs not be assessed in only a part of the community to be served; . . . such a
result would unfairly deny the benefits of the merger to some of those who sustain
its direct and immediate anticompetitive effects.
Id.; see also United States v. First Nat'l State Bancorporation, 499 F. Supp. 793, 816-17
(D.N.J. 1980) (defendant's burden of proving defense unsatisfied).
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C. Supervision of Mergers by Other Banking Institutions
There has been considerably less concern about the competitive
implications of mergers involving "thrift institutions" than those of
commercial banks. Because thrift institutions tend to be smaller, and
because they are generally subject to greater competition from other
kinds of banks, such mergers or acquisitions are usually less likely to
adversely affect competition.' 3 '
1. Savings and Loan Associations and Mutual Savings Banks
The assignment of responsibility for regulating proposed mergers
of savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks'32
depends on whether the institution is a separate institution or is part
of (or will become part of) a holding company. If the proposed tran-
saction involves two savings and loan associations, supervisory
responsibility is conferred on the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board;' 33 if the transaction involves a thrift institution holding com-
pany, responsibility falls on the Board's subordinate agency, the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. 34
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board's authority to regulate ac-
quisitions and mergers by independent savings and loan associations
is conferred by statute.' Unlike the Bank Merger Act or the Bank
Holding Company Act,' 3 6 the statutory provision covering these
thrift institutions contains no standards for the Board to apply in
deciding whether to approve a transaction. Instead, the Board has
promulgated a policy statement, articulating the factors it will con-
sider;' 37 these factors are similar to the criteria courts have applied in
evaluating commercial bank acquisitions.' 38
The standards regarding mergers or acquisitions by savings and
131. See United States v. Chelsea Sav. Bank, 300 F. Supp. 721 (D. Conn. 1969) (Clayton
Act § 7 also applies to mergers by non-stock mutual savings banks).
132. The Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982), provides that "[tihe
term 'association' means a Federal savings and loan association or a Federal mutual savings
bank .... and any reference in any other law to a Federal savings and loan association shall
be deemed to be also a reference to a Federal mutual savings bank, unless the context indicates
otherwise." Id. § 1462(d). All references in this portion of this article to savings and loan
associations will therefore include treatment of mutual savings bank.
133. Id. § 1464(d)(11).
134. Id. § 1730a(e).
135. The statute provides that "(tihe Board shall have power to make rules and regula-
tions for the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, and dissolution of associations, [and]
for the merger of associations with other institutions the accounts of which are insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation." Id. § 1464(d)(1 1).
136. See supra notes 33-69 and accompanying text.
137. 12 C.F.R. § 571.5 (1986).
138. The Board's statement follows:
In determining whether a violation of the antitrust laws is likely, the Board will ex-
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loan holding companies are specified by the National Housing Act,
as amended. '39 The Act confers authority to supervise mergers and
acquisitions of a "savings and loan holding company".14 on the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.'"' Upon applica-
tion for approval of such a transaction, the Corporation is required
to obtain a report from the Attorney General on the competitive fac-
tors the transaction implicates. 2 These factors are identical to those
applicable to commercial bank mergers-a determination of the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction, with the
possibility that they will be "clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the acquisition in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served.' 4
3
2. Credit Unions
Regulation of mergers by credit unions is similar to that of in-
dependent savings and loan associations;'4 4 the statute itself contains
amine all of the relevant facts, including: (i) competition currently existing in the
relevant markets . . .; (ii) market shares and the reliability thereof .. ; (iii) the
ranking of the resulting institution and of other competing institutions in the rele-
vant markets; (iv) the number and size distribution of competitors; (v) trends in the
market toward concentration or deconcentration; and (vi) the history and pattern of
expansion and growth in the market, including the existence of potential entrants
and future procompetitive trends. . . . The Board will also examine the extent to
which the transaction will affect the convenience and needs of the communities to
be served and the impact, if any, on operating efficiency of the resulting or purchas-
ing institution.
Id. § 571.5(b)(3)-(4). See generally Brumbaugh, The Antitrust Merger Criteria for Federally In-
sured Savings and Loan Associations, 16 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 12 (1983); Leibold,
Mergers of FSLIC Insured Savings and Loan Associations, 37 Bus. LAW. 868 (1982); Tucker,
Savings and Loan Association Mergers, 43 CONN. B.J. 394 (1969); Yurchuck, Pre-Merger
Legal Analysis, 26 Bus. LAW. 383 (1970).
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-1750g (1982).
140. A "savings and loan holding company" is defined as "any company which directly
or indirectly controls an insured institution or controls any other company which is a savings
and loan holding company. ... Id. § 1730a(a)(1)(D).
141. Id. § 1730a(e)(1). These provisions of the National Housing Act apply as well to the
acquisition of only a single savings and loan association, (rather than to the acquisition of
"more than one insured institution," despite the use of that latter phrase in § 1730a(e)(2))
and to the acquisition of such a thrift institution by a holding company formerly controlling
only a commercial bank. Fort Worth Nat'l Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d
47, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1972).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e)(2) (1982).
143. Id. § 1730a(e)(2)(B); cf. id. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (bank mergers); id. § 1842(c)(2) bank
holding company mergers). The legislative history makes clear this intent to duplicate the stan-
dards of these other statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 997, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967) (quoted
in Fort Wayne Natl Bank, 469 F.2d at 56. See generally Roster, Acquisitions of Savings and
Loan Associations by Holding Companies, 36 Bus. LAW. 875 (1982).
144. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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no stated criteria; instead, authority is granted to the appropriate
regulatory body-in this case, the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration-to promulgate rules governing these transactions.",
The Administration has in fact promulgated such regulations;'4
however, unlike those of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,'4 7 the
NCUA regulations make no mention of the antitrust laws or of com-
petitive concerns. In fact, research reveals no instance in which ap-
proval for a proposed merger of credit unions was withheld because
of antitrust concerns.
IV. INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
An interlocking directorship''"-the presence of the same person
on the board of directors of two corporations-may indirectly ad-
vance or even effect the same anticompetitive results which would be
undesirable or illegal if achieved by a direct agreement between the
two corporations themselves. Because of the critical importance of
the banking industry to competition-both among banking institu-
tions themselves, and because the lending ability of banks is often
necessary for competition by industrial concerns-interlocking direc-
torates by banking officials can have particularly acute implications.
Two statutes exist which limit interlocking directorates in the
banking industry-section 8 of the Clayton Act'49 and the
Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act of 1978 (In-
terlocks Act).' 50 Although in one respect section 8 has a slightly
broader reach than the Interlocks Act,' 5' as a practical matter the
1978 statute has effectively supplanted the Clayton Act as the
regulator of interlocking bank directorates.' 52
145. 12 U.S.C. § 1766(a) (1982).
146. 12 C.F.R. § 708 (1986).
147. Cf. supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
148. See generally IV E. KINTNER, supra note 72, at ch. 42 (discussing interlocking direc-
torates); Tavers, Interlocks in Corporate Managment and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEX. L. REV.
819 (1968); sources cited infra note 14.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
150. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3672-3675 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (1982)).
The Act was amended in 1982 by the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1524 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3208 (Supp. III (1986))). This amendment
expended the enforcement powers of the Department of Justice. See infra note 172 and accom-
panying text.
151. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
152. See 12 C.F.R. § 212.7 (1986) ("The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System regards the provisions of the first three paragraphs of section 8 of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. § 19) to have been supplanted by the revised and more comprehensive prohibitions on
management official interlocks between depository organizations in the Interlock Act.").
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A. Clayton Act Section 8
The principal provision of section 8 of the Clayton Act makes it
unlawful for any private banker' 53 or any director, officer, or
employee of any member bank of the Federal Reserve System to be
simultaneously a director, officer or employee of any national or
state bank, banking association, savings bank, or trust company.
While this provision reaches many kinds of interlocking directorates,
it is underinclusive in a number of ways. First, it is limited to direc-
torships in certain kinds of financial or banking institutions.'5 Se-
cond, the statute itself contains a number of exceptions, including a
significant geographical limitation, making the statute's prohibitions
inapplicable unless the two institutions are located (or have a branch
in) the same (or a contiguous or adjacent) city, town or village.' 55
Third, the Supreme Court recently held, in Bankamerica Corp. v.
United States,"16 that section 8 is inapplicable to a directorship held
by an officer or director of a bank in a competing, but nonbanking,
corporation. 1 " Therefore, the 1978 Act principally regulates in-
terlocking bank directorates.
153. The now-repealed Federal Reserve Board Regulations to § 8 had defined a "private
banker" as "an unincorporated individual engaged in the banking business or a member of an
unincorporated firm engaged in such business." Id. § 212.1(b) n.2 (1979).
154. The prohibition is underinclusive in two ways. First, it applies only to a "director, of-
ficer, or employee of any member bank of the Federal Reserve System," 15 U.S.C. § 19
(1982). As noted above, see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text, this includes national
banks and "state member banks," but excludes "state nonmember insured banks" and "state
nonmember uninsured banks." Second, such a person is precluded from holding a director-
ship only in "any other bank, banking association, savings bank, or trust company." 15
U.S.C. § 19. As the now-repealed Federal Reserve Board regulations observed, this makes the
prohibition inapplicable to directorships in savings and loan associations or credit unions, and
also in Joint Stock Land banks, Federal Land banks, Federal Reserve banks, Federal In-
termediate Credit banks, The Central Bank for Cooperatives, Federal Home Loan banks,
foreign banks, or banks organized under the laws of American territories such as Puerto Rico.
12 C.F.R. § 212.1(b) n.3 (1986).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 19(5) (1982). Section 8 is also inapplicable if at least 90076 of the stock of
the "second" bank is owned by the United States, id. § 19(1); if the "second" bank is in
receivership or is being liquidated, id. § 19(2); if the stock of the member bank and the "se-
cond" bank are at least 5007o owned by the same person, id. § 19(4); if the member bank and
the "second" bank are not in competition (i.e., they are "not engaged in (the same] class or
classes of business"), id. § 19(6); or if the "second" bank is a nonstock mutual savings bank,
id. § 19(7).
156. 462 U.S. 122 (1983), noted in, Comment, Antitrust Law-Clayton Act-Interlocking
Bank/Non-Bank Directorates-Statutory Interpretation-Bankamerica Corp. v. United States,
30 NY.L. SCH. L. REV. 777 (1985).
157. 462 U.S. at 130-31. In the Bankamerica case, the Government challenged the service
by five individuals-each of whom served on the board of directors of a bank or bank holding
company-on the board of an insurance company at the same time. The parties stipulated that
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B. Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act of 1978
In the late 1970s, the perception arose that existing legislation
dealing with interlocking bank directorates was inadequate and out-
dated. ' Therefore, Title II of the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978159 more extensively limited
these interlocks. Title II, which is referred to as the Depository In-
stitution Managment Interlocks Act, 6 ' made two major changes
beyond the existing legislation. It extended the prohibitions to most
kinds of financial institutions, and it expanded the geographic reach
of the prohibitions when particularly large financial institutions are
involved.
Unlike section 8 of the Clayton Act, which restricts employees, of-
ficers and directors only of Federal Reserve Board member banks, 6 '
the Interlocks Act prohibits certain interlocking directorates by a
''management official'" 16 of any type of "depository institution or a
the interlocked banks and insurance companies competed in the market for mortgage and real
estate loans. Id. at 124.
Paragraph 4 of § 8 of the Clayton Act provides that "[n]o person at the same time shall be a
director in any two or more corporations . . . other than banks, banking associations [and]
trust companies." At issue was whether this language should be read to prohibit such in-
terlocks involving "two or more corporations [none of which are] banks," or "two or more
corporations [not all of which are] banks." Id. at 125.
In a 5-3 decision, the opinion of which was written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court opted
for the former reading, thus finding the Clayton Act inapplicable to bank-nonbank interlocks.
Support for that conclusion was found (1) by giving the language of the statute its "most
natural reading," id. at 128; (2) after noting that the Government had not brought a previous
action asserting this interpretation of § 8 in the over 60 years since the Clayton Act was
enacted in 1914, and noting the apparent acquiescence by the Congress in this interpretation,
id. at 130-32; and (3) by examining the legislative history of the Clayton Act, evidencing the
view by many members of Congress that banks were to be treated only by the first three
paragraphs of § 8, and that the fourth paragraph was to apply only to industrial organizations,
id. at 133-39. See generally Comment, The Need for Antitrust Legislation Tailored to the
Specific Concerns of Bank-Nonbank Director Interlocks, 1982 DUKE L.J. 938; Comment, In-
terlocks in Management Between Savings and Loan Associations and Commercial Banks
Under the Antitrust Laws and the FTC Act, 65 GEO. L.J. 1263 (1977); Note, Interlocking
Directorates Among Banks and Nonbanking Institutions, 9 J. LEGIS. 332 (1982); Note, In-
terlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act: A Realistic Look at the Nature of Banking and
Insurance Today, 3 W. ST. U.L. REV. 284 (1976); cf. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (Section 8 applicable to ownership by trust company of
blocks of stock in two competing industrial corporations, and then placing its employees on
boards of directors of those competitors).
158. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 9273, 9286-87.
159. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
160. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, 3672 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3207 (1982)).
161. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
162. 12 U.S.C. § 3201(4) (1982). "I[T]he term 'management official' means an employee or of-
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depository holding company."' 63 As a result, the prohibition extends
not only to directors of all kinds of commercial banks, but also to
directors of savings banks, trust companies, savings and loan
associations, building and loan associations, cooperative banks and
credit unions."'
The geographic extent of the prohibition on interlocking direc-
torates is graduated, depending on the size of the depository institu-
tion. First, no person may serve simultaneously as a management
official of two such institutions-regardless of their size-the offices
of which are located in the same, contiguous or adjacent city, town,
or village or in contiguous or adjacent cities, towns, or villages.' 65
Second, if the depository institutions have assets of more than $20
million, the prohibition is broadened to bar simultaneous director-
ships of institutions with offices in the same standard metropolitan
statistical area.'66 Finally, no person who is a management official
of a depository institution that has assets exceeding $1 billion may
serve at the same time as a management official of another such in-
stitution having assets over $500 million anywhere in the country.' 67
Enforcement of the Interlocks Act falls on the five separate agen-
cies16 with responsibility for supervising the different kinds of finan-
cial institutions;'69 these agencies are also authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations exempting an otherwise unlawful directorate if,
ficer with management functions, a direcior (including an advisory or honorary director), a
trustee of a business organization under the control of trustees, or any person who has a
representative or nominee serving in any such capacity .... Id. To this extent, Clayton Act §
8 may be slightly broader, since its prohibitions extend to simultaneous service as a director,
officer or employee, without regard to management status, of a member bank and a "second"
bank.
163. Id. § 3205. The statute provided for a phase-in period, allowing persons whose direc-
torship positions were only made unlawful for the first time by the Act a period of ten years
before that relationship had to be terminated. Id.
164. Id. § 3201(l)-(2).
165. Id. § 3202(2).
166. Id. § 3202(1). This provision was amended in 1983 to substitute the terms "primary
metropolitan statistical area, the same metropolitan statistical area, or the same consolidated
metropolitan statistical area that is not comprised of designated primary metropolitan
statistical areas" for the former term "standard metropolitan statistical area." Pub. L. No.
98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1267 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3202(1) (Supp. III (1986))).
167. 12 U.S.C. § 3203 (1982). As with Clayton Act § 8, cf. supra note 154, the Interlocks
Act contains a number of exceptions. For example, the prohibitions are inapplicable to depository
institutions in liquidation or receivership, 12 U.S.C. § 3204(1); to foreign banking institutions,
id. § 3204(4); to state-chartered savings and loan guaranty corporations, id. § 3204(5); or to
Federal Home Loan Banks, id. § 3204(6).
168. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
169. 12 U.S.C. § 3206 (1982).
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on balance, the relationship would promote competition.' 70 The In-
terlocks Act also provided for the agencies to refer potential viola-
tions to the Attorney General for enforcement.' 7' In 1982, the Act
was amended to allow the Attorney General-or the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Antitrust Division-to commence
enforcement proceedings on his own initiative, without first awaiting
agency referral.' 7
V. CONDITIONAL TRANSACTIONS
The general antitrust laws-specifically section 1 of the Sherman
Act,'73 section 3 of the Clayton Act,' 74 and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act' 75-contain provisions making certain condi-
tional transactions unlawful.' 76 These laws prohibit tying ar-
rangements, exclusive dealing arrangements, and reciprocal dealing
arrangements in a variety of situations, and the victims of such
restraints may sue for injunctive or treble damage relief.
These general provisions may be inadequate to deal with such con-
ditional transactions by banking institutions. First, certain statutory
elements of a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act are absent in
almost all banking institution restrictions;'77 thus, plaintiffs must
rely solely on the other two statutory prohibitions. 78 Second, recent
170. Id. § 3207. The regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board appear at 12
C.F.R. § 212 (1986).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 3206(6) (1982).
172. Id. § 3208. This amendment was part of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3208 (Supp. III
(1986))).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
174. Id. § 14.
175. Id. § 45.
176. A number of articles have addressed various aspects of this topic. See, e.g., Edwards,
Economics of 'Tying' Arrangements: Some Proposed Guidelines for Bank Holding Company
Regulation, 6 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 87 (1973); Edwards, Tie-In Sales in Banking and
One Bank Holding Companies, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 587 (1969); Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins:
Where Banks Stand After the Fortner Decision, 95 BANKING L. J. 419 (1978); Leonard, Unfair
Competition Under Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act: An Economic and Legal
Overview of "Conditional Transactions," 94 BANKING L.J. 773 (1977); Naegele, The Anti-
tying Provision: Its Potential Is Still There, 100 BANKING L.J. 138 (1983); Note, Section 1972:
Augmenting the Available Remedies for Plaintiffs Injured by Anticompetitive Bank Conduct,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 706 (1985); see also Annotation, What Constitutes Violation of Pro-
visions of Bank Holding Company Act Prohibiting Tying Arrangements, 74 A.L.R. Fed. 578
(1985).
177. Section 3 applies only to a contract for the "sale or lease" of "goods ... or other
commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). A loan of money or extension of credit would not fall within
this statutory language.
178. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts "in restraint of trade," does
not impose the jurisdictional requirements of Clayton § 3, but requires at least as much show-
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case law, which imposes higher requirements on a Sherman or
Clayton Act plaintiff, makes success under the general antitrust laws
far more difficult.' 79 Third, the particular nature of the banking in-
dustry makes it more important to prohibit such transactions here
than in other less sensitive or important segments of the economy. I"
In light of these limitations of the general antitrust laws, Congress
has on two occasions passed specific legislation to deal with condi-
tional transactions by members of the banking industry-section 106
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 19701 and section 331 of the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.111 The 1970
Act, which was aimed at commercial banks and bank holding com-
panies, "prohibit[s] anticompetitive practices which require bank
customers to accept or provide some other service or product or
refrain from dealing with other parties in order to obtain the bank
product or service they desire;"' 83 the Act also provides an exemp-
tion for reasonable or traditional banking practices.'I 4 The 1982 Act
ing of the substantive elements of a Clayton Act violation, if not more. Id. § I. Section 5 of the
FTC Act, while imposing lower threshold requirements because of its quality as an incipiency
statute, can only be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission. Id. § 45.
This is not to say, however, that these statutory provisions could not be used to challenge
conditional transactions by banks. Two of the leading Sherman Act tying arrangement cases
involved the extension of credit by a nonbank lending institution on the condition that the bor-
rower purchase certain goods sold by an affiliate of the lender. United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner I); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner 1).
179. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Fortner
Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (Fortner II).
180. See generally Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 244-45 (11 th Cir.
1982); Note, Section 1972, supra note 173, at 707-15 (describing policy considerations unique
to bank industry conditional transactions).
181. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760, 1766-68 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978
(1982)).
182. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1503-04 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (Supp.
III (1986))).
183. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5519, 5535.
184. The key prohibition of the 1970 Act is as follows:
(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of any
kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the
foregoing, on the condition or requirement-
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or ser-
vice from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or service
from a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other subsidiary of
such bank holding company;
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to
such bank, other than those related to and usually provided in connection with
a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
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extends these same proscriptions to federally chartered savings and
loan associations and federally chartered savings banks. Employing
similar language, both statutory provisions not only make such con-
ditional transactions unlawful, but also allow injunctive relief'85 or
treble damage relief'8 6 for injured parties."'
Three broad issues have arisen in connection with these provi-
sions: (1) whether the conduct is the type of conditional transaction
encompassed within the statutory language; (2) whether the conduct
falls within the statutory exemptions for traditional or reasonable
banking practices; and (3) whether the plaintiff has standing to bring
an action.
A. Conduct Prohibited By Statutes
The statutes make it unlawful for a bank to impose a variety of
credit or deposit requirements on a customer as a condition of the in-
itial transaction.' 88 The statutes reach all three types of "conditional
requirements:" tying arrangements,' 89 exclusive dealing re-
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to
a bank holding company of such bank, or to any other subsidiary of such bank
holding company; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or service
from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company, other than a condi-
tion or requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a credit transac-
tion to assure the soundness of the credit.
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing
prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purpose of this chapter.
12 U.S.C. § 1972(l)(A)-(E) (1982).
185. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1976, 1464(q)(2) (Supp. Il (1986)).
186. Id. §§ 1975, 1464(q)(3); see also Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlan-
tic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (E.D. Va. 1979) (in light of availability of treble
damages, punitive damages unavailable).
187. The 1970 Act also contains an express provision allowing for enforcement of its pro-
scriptions by the Attorney General. 12 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). As one commentator has noted,
however, the Government does not seem to have brought an action under this statute.
Naegele, The Anti-tying Provision: Its Potential Is Still There, 100 BANKING L.J. 138, 144
(1983).
188. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (1982). The statute applies, inter alia, to conditions imposed by
a bank when it "extend[s] credit." Id. This term has been given a broad interpretation. See,
e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 244 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (refinancing
loan was "extension of credit"); Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir. 1978)
(forebearance on collection of loan), rev'g, 408 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Nordic Bank
PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Freidco, Ltd. v.
Farmers Bank, 499 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (D. Del. 1980) (deferral of payment on past due obliga-
tions). But cf. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 556 F. Supp. 1100, 1107-08 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (in-
crease in amount of interest or finance charge is integral part of loan term rather than addi-
tional requirement; no tie-in exists).
189. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(l)(A)-(B) (1982).
ALTERED ANTITRUST STANDARDS
quirements,' 9 ° and reciprocal dealing arrangements. 9 ' Not surpris-
ingly, the majority of successfully litigated cases have been of the tie-
in variety. One bank violated the statute when it required an in-
dividual borrower, a major stockholder in a corporation, to have
that corporation sell to the bank a substantial share of its retail com-
mercial paper as a condition of obtaining a personal loan.1 92 Sim-
ilarly, a bank's decision no longer to honor a financing arrangement
with a corporation unless fifty-one percent of the corporation's
stock was transferred to another bank customer was also held
unlawful.' 93
One significant substantive difference between the specialized
bank anti-tying provisions and the general tying proscriptions of the
antitrust laws is the absence under the special laws of a requirement
of proof of competitive injury. The Supreme Court has recently im-
posed increased requirements under section 1 of the Sherman Act
that the plaintiff show that the defendant has market power in the ty-
ing product and that there is a likelihood that competition in the tied
product market will be substantially impaired. 9 On the other hand,
a violation of section 106 of the 1970 Bank Holding Act, or section
331 of the Garn-St Germain Act, can be made out merely by proving
the bare existence of the described conditional transaction.'"
In a substantial majority of the decisions, however, the courts
have held the challenged conduct to be outside the statutes. As is
often true, the scope of the conduct which falls within the statutory
190. See id. § 1972(1)(E).
191. See id. § 1972(l)(C)-(D). An instance of this type of restraint arose in Freidco Del.,
Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, where the plaintiff, a borrower from defendant bank, complained that
the defendant had used its market power to coerce plaintiff to assign rental payments on cer-
tain real estate to the defendant on terms unfavorable to plaintiff. 499 F. Supp. at 1001.
192. Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978); see also Nordic Bank
PLC, 619 F. Supp. at 557 (borrower forced to guarantee debts owed by two other corporations
to defendant bank).
193. Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g, 408 F. Supp. 940
(S.D. Fla. 1976); see also Sterling Coal Co. v. United Am. Bank, 470 F. Supp. 964, 965 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979) (cause of action stated by allegations that defendant bank required borrower to
utilize bank's legal counsel, that it required plaintiff to enter into an exclusive sales agreement
with specific company, and that it prohibited plaintiff from utilizing bank services of bank's
competitors).
194. See supra note 179.
195. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2279 (1986); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 245 (11th Cir.
1982); Costner, 578 F.2d at 1196. But cf. McGee v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 761 F.2d
647 (11 th Cir.) (insistence that appraisal required for real estate loan be performed by sub-
sidiary of lender; no tie-in existed, since there is no separate market or demand for appraisal;
only one product-the loan-was involved), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 273 (1985).
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proscription may best be gleaned by considering cases rejecting its
application. It has been held that it is not unlawful for a bank to in-
sist that the borrower employ or retain as a consultant a certain in-
dividual;'96 that the borrower discharge a particular individual to
make a specified change in management;' 97 that the borrower
deposit money in accounts with the lender bank;9 8 that the borrower
subject its business to the bank's supervision or control; 199 or that
the corporate borrower assume the personal liability of its two sole
stockholders and pay the interest on one stockholder's personal
loans.200
B. Exemptions From Liability
The reach of the statutes is limited by both explicit and implicit
statutory restrictions. The lack of success by the majority of plain-
tiffs asserting actions under these bank anti-tying provisions is a pro-
duct of several factors. The statutes themselves contain several ex-
emptions, which allow a bank to insist that the borrower employ cer-
tain "traditional services" of the bank;"' to require that borrowers
agree to conditional transactions when such a restriction is usual and
196. Parsons Steel, 679 F.2d at 246. B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 639
F.2d 828, 832-33 (1st cir. 1981).
197. Parsons Steel, 679 F.2d at 244; Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 897 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
198. Clark v. United Bank, 480 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004
(1973); Nesglo, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 506 F. Supp. 254, 260-65 (D.P.R. 1980);
Freidco, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 499 F. Supp. 995, 1001-03 (D. Del. 1980).
199. Pappas v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 653 F. Supp. 699, 705 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (performance of audit of borrower's financial situation); Sterling Coal Co. v. United
Am. Bank, 470 F. Supp. 964, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
200. Sterling Coal Co., 470 F. Supp. at 965; see also Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 768
F.2d 140, 143-44 (7th Cir. 1985) (not unlawful to condition grant of one loan on grant of
another separate loan); Duryea v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 606 F.2d 823, 826 (8th Cir.
1979) (no violation where bank imposed no conditions or requirements upon plaintiff); Nordic
Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (several examples
of conduct not within statute); Dannhausen v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F. Supp. 551, 563-64
(E.D. Wis. 1982) (no violation to require borrower to assume debts of related business);
Shulman v. Continental Bank, 513 F. Supp. 979, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (no violation to condi-
tion loan on requirement that principal shareholders also make loan to borrower); Continental
Bank v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 193 N.J. 153, 459 A.2d 1163, 1167-71 (no violation to
condition loan of additional funds on grant of mortgage to lending bank by major stockholder
of borrower of his interest in another corporation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983). See
generally Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1984).
201. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A) (1982). The statute prohibits a bank from extend-
ing credit, leasing or selling property, or furnishing a service, on the condition "that the
customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or service from such bank other than a
loan, discount, deposit, or trust service." Id. (emphasis added).
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customary in the industry in connection with such loan
transactions; 20 2 or when the restriction is necessary to allow the bank
to protect the soundness of its credit or of the loan in question. 20 3
Furthermore, it has been held that the defendant bank must benefit
from the conditions being imposed, because the statute bases the il-
legality on the lender's requirement that the conditional property or
service be obtained from, or furnished to, the lending bank. 204 In ad-
dition, courts have inferred a congressional unwillingness to interfere
with reasonable practices of bankers, which are deemed necessary to
protect the banks' investments, the financial soundness of their in-
stitution, or the interests of the banks' other depositors. 2 5
C. Standing
The statutes provide that an action for damages may be brought
by "[alny person who is injured in his business or property by reason
of" a violation of the statutes' substantive prohibitions. 0 6 Since this
provision, which uses virtually identical language to the basic treble
damage provision in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 207 has been given
different interpretations by the courts, it is difficult to make
generalizations about the standing requirement for bank tie-ins.
Some courts have interpreted the standing requirement similarly to
202. Id. § 1972(l)(C). The statute prohibits a bank from insisting that its customers "pro-
vide some additional credit, property, or service to such bank, other than those related to and
usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service." Id. (emphasis
added).
203. Id. § 1972(1)(E). The statute prohibits a bank from insisting that a customer not ob-
tain credit or services from a competitor of that bank, "other than a condition or requirement
that such bank shall reasonably impose in a credit transaction to assure the soundness of the
credit." Id.
204. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 246 (11th Cir. 1982); Pappas v.
N.C.N.B. Nat'l Bank, 653 F. Supp. 699, 706 (M.D.N.C. 1987). But see Swerdloff v. Miami
Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir. 1978) (benefit to bank can be inferred from requirement
that borrower had to sell its stock to designated customer of bank), rev'g, 408 F. Supp. 940
(S.D. Fla. 1976).
205. Parsons Steel, 679 F.2d at 245; Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 897-98 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 639 F.2d
828, 831-32 (1st Cir. 1981); McCoy v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 636 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1980);
Clark v. United Bank, 480 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Nor-
dic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.
1984); Nesglo, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 506 F. Supp. 254, 260-65 (D.P.R. 1980); Freid-
co, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 499 F. Supp. 995, 1002-03 (D. Del. 1980); Sterling Coal Co., Inc. v.
United Am. Bank, 470 F. Supp. 964, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Continental Bank v. Barclay
Riding Academy, Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 459 A.2d 1163, 1167-71, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
206. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
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that of Clayton Act section 4, requiring that the injury be direct and
immediate.2"' Other courts have found a congressional intent to af-
ford a more expansive remedy than the basic antitrust prohibition on
tying arrangements, and thus have allowed actions by less directly in-
jured plaintiffs." 9 On one hand, therefore, it has been held that the
individual shareholders of a privately-held corporate borrower, who
gave their personal guarantees to repay the bank's loan, were
"customers" of the bank and thus had standing to complain of
unlawful conditions imposed by the bank in connection with the
loan.2"' On the other hand, another court refused to allow standing
by individual shareholders of a corporate borrower, who were re-
quired as a condition of a loan to provide loan funds as junior par-
ticipants. The court held that they could not assert their own claim
for injury as a result of the alleged statutory violation.'
In brief, the statutory provisions prohibiting certain conditional
transactions by banks reflect a congressional concern that banks
should be kept from using their economic muscle to coerce
customers. On the other hand, both the statutory exemptions and
the cautious treatment by some courts reflect a desire not to interfere
with banking practices that protect the banks' depositors or in-
vestors. Therefore, while the statutes are more expansive than the
general antitrust laws, since they do not require actual proof of anti-
competitive effect, they have not become the active force for
restraining certain banking practices which some litigants or
legislators might desire.
208. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied en banc, 784 F.2d 1113, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2279 (1986).
209. See, e.g., Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 58-60 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'g,
408 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 585 F.
Supp. 1385, 1387-88 (N.D. I1l. 1984) (no standing under Sherman Act; standing existed under
Bank Holding Company Act).
210. Swerdloff, 584 F.2d at 59; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 585 F. Supp. at
1388 (stockholder also acting as guarantor of loans); see also Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank,
578 F.2d 1192, 1195 (6th Cir. 1978) (shareholder of injured corporate borrower had standing
to complain of diminution in value of stock shares).
211. Shulman v. Continental Bank, 513 F. Supp. 979, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Camp-
bell, 781 F.2d at 443 (assignee of borrower's leasehold rights lacks standing); Duryea v. Third
Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 606 F.2d 823, 825-26 (8th Cir. 1979) (no claim where plaintiff never
dealt directly with bank, but instead signed notes promising to repay money borrowed by third
party from bank and loaned by that party to plaintiff); Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E. 2d 767, 770 (1984) (wives of borrowers, who acted as
sureties on their husbands' loans, were not "customers" of lending bank and thus could not
rely on Act as defense).
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CONCLUSION
Because of their importance to the American economy, banking
institutions and other parts of the financial industry have on occa-
sion been held to different standards under the antitrust laws. For
example, more relaxed standards apply to bank mergers than govern
unregulated industries; on the other hand, greater restrictions on
conditional transactions in the banking industry apply. For the most
part, courts have recognized that competition is as important in the
banking industry as elsewhere in the economy, and thus generally
similar standards prevail. A recognition of the different nature of the
financial industry and of the occasional limitations therein on un-
bridled competition, however, will help in understanding this occa-
sional special treatment.

